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I greatly appreciate the thoughtful essays on my book in this issue and 
welcome the opportunity to respond to them. At the outset I wish to point 
out that three of the essays (those by Nicholas F. Gier, Gerald James 
Larson and Robert A. Yelle) explicitly assume that Being Different’s 
position depend on Advaita Vedånta and that I regard the world as an 
illusion. Both assumptions are incorrect. My project rejects such common 
stances about Hinduism for a variety of reasons: Either they are too 
limiting and apply only to one narrow school (such as Advaita Vedånta), 
thereby making it impossible to have a broader dharmic worldview from 
where to gaze at the West. Or they are too broad and end up encompassing 
all religions, including Western ones. I am seeking something in between 
these poles. 
Rather than nitpicking each issue in the essays, I have identified four 
broad areas where the six authors have highlighted some concerns, and 
will address each in a separate section. Section One addresses the variety 
of methodological issues raised concerning the very nature of my project, 
which is to present a dharmic view of the West and highlight the contrasts 
between the two civilizations. Section Two defends one of the core theses 
of the book, namely, that there is such a thing as a unified dharmic gaze 
despite serious internal differences and diversity among the schools and 
sub-schools. This section includes a pivotal discussion on the non-trans-
latable term “mithyå.” Section Three defends the charge that Western 
Civilization lacks the same kind of unity as Dharma and that its unity is 
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of a different kind. Section Four comes to the heart of what I feel the 
authors of the essays in this issue, and my critics elsewhere, are deeply 
concerned about, even when they are not saying it explicitly: They 
disapprove of the very existence of a “dharmic” family, whereas my 
project depends upon the coherence of such a unity. Finally, Section Five 
addresses a few additional issues. 
 
The Methodological Challenges of Reversing the Gaze 
 
India is an amazingly fertile crucible. It has been the birthplace of the 
largest number of modern faiths outside the Abrahamic religions. This 
makes India as important as the Middle East in the study of humankind. 
And India is no simple place to understand. Just as there are immense 
differences among the Abrahamic religions at the same time that they 
share deep-rooted common assumptions and historical links, so also the 
faiths born in India have commonalities as well as differences. My 
project is to look for axiomatic contrasts between the Western and Indian 
families, keeping in mind that each is vast, old, robust, internally diverse 
and philosophically profound. In this context, the notion of family is that 
of a statistical cluster consisting of distinct members. Each cluster has 
meaningful internal commonalities that separate it from other clusters for 
the purpose of such an analysis. 
In many comparative studies, the baseline view of Dharma generally 
tends to highlight caste discrimination and other human rights abuses 
(which no doubt need to be studied separately as topics in their own 
right) and present these in contrast with Western “rationality,” “progress,” 
“freedom” and the like. Of course, dharmic societies and cultures can be 
criticized along several lines with great validity, but as a basis for gazing 
at the West, this is not the most productive starting point.  
Robert A. Yelle acknowledges that the preponderance of such compar-
isons and the relative marginalization of the dharmic perspectives in 
Western discourse make it necessary for an extensive critique of Western 
religions through the Dharma lens. Yet he strongly disagrees with my 
approach and calls for an approach based on “a shared humanity.” Gerald 
James Larson also notes that Being Different does not attempt to make a 
neutral comparison between Indian and Western civilizations, but rather 
articulates difference from an explicitly dharmic position.  
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Given the conditioning to which all human beings are susceptible, I do 
not believe that a truly neutral position is genuinely possible, let alone 
practical. The scholars’ aspiration toward a “neutral” gaze is especially 
suspect when the comparisons they make employ Western hermeneutics 
and categories, regardless of the intentions. We know of many universal 
claims made by Westerners in the past. To give just a few examples: The 
conquistadors claimed a universal gaze bestowed on them by God with 
regard to their view of Native Americans. The Europeans claimed to be 
the keepers of “a shared humanity” in their justification of black slavery, 
Native American genocide, and Indian colonization. The fascism that 
emanated from G.W.F. Hegel (and culminated in Hitler’s Auschwitz) 
resulted from his “universalism” and was justified as being in the best 
interest of the “World Spirit.” We have been there before!  
Bias is inherent in any “gaze from somewhere” as opposed to a “gaze 
from nowhere” (a position claimed by many postmodernists). The dia-
logue I seek is a process of challenge and response in which civilizations 
engage in p¨rvapak‚a and uttaråpak‚a with one another, in an atmosphere 
of equality, and without pulling their punches. It is time for the native to 
talk back in his own terms and be prepared to face the charge of “essen-
tialism.” Such talking back is imperative if we are to evolve towards a 
multipolar world in which the present-day West becomes one of the 
provinces but not the center. 
 
Provocative Agenda 
Being Different posits that diverse dharmic schools share a core set of 
differences from Western universalism, and hence these dharmic schools 
comprise a family. It sequentially examines specific aspects of Western 
traditions, and illustrates how Dharma differs in areas such as: the separa-
tion of sm®ti from çruti, the contextual nature of sm®ti, the complete 
absence in Dharma of a central corporate authority that is equivalent to 
the Church, and the special status accorded to enlightened masters of 
Dharma traditions during their lifetime. Such “otherizing” of the West is 
the p¨rvapak‚a methodology of identifying a common dharmic substrate 
without essentializing Dharma into any categorical definition in absolute 
terms.  
Being Different intends to provoke. Rather than merely teaching the 
current state of play in the discourse, it seeks to change the discourse 
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itself. This opens the door for new scholarship in which followers of 
Dharma would be able to participate from the perspective of their own 
conditioning and experiences. 
 
Avoiding Epistemic Relativism 
Rita Gross is critical of this confrontational stance. It is both unnecessary 
and problematic, she argues, because very few people suffer from the 
rhetoric of “sameness.” (In other words, she implies that people already 
appreciate the differences, making such a project unnecessary.) My own 
experience with Hindu leaders, however, is that they are very keen to 
promote sameness. They imagine that they are doing a favor to Christians 
by calling Jesus an avatåra; to Muslims by singing “Ûçvar Allåh tere 
nåm” (“Ûçvar and Allåh are names of the same one”; which orthodox 
Muslims consider blasphemous); and to Buddhists by claiming that 
Buddhism is a part of Hinduism with Buddha as the latest avatåra of 
Lord Vi‚~u. On the Christian side, this sameness syndrome afflicts not 
only a large number of well-meaning laypeople (such as those who call 
themselves Spiritual But Not Religious), but also the work of many 
scholars including Huston Smith, John Hick and the perennialists. (While 
it has become fashionable in the academy to accuse Svåmi Vivekånanda 
and other “Hindu nationalists” for “inventing modern Hinduism,” the 
role of Western enthusiasts such as the perennialists is not adequately 
discussed.)  
Gross criticizes Being Different for not letting “others be different 
without regarding different systems as less cogent than one’s own.” Here 
I wish to distinguish between mutual respect (which I espouse) and mutual 
agreement (which I do not espouse as the starting point): I can respect 
you even when I disagree with you. I respect your right to believe what I 
may have rejected for myself. And I make no attempt to convert you or 
denounce you for your beliefs on the basis of some kind of moral suasion 
or a priori assumption of my superiority. But I am not an epistemic rela-
tivist who feels that all truth-claims are equally true. In reversing my 
gaze, therefore, the other side appears to me exotic and/or incoherent in 
many ways. I do not think mutual respect forecloses the argument for    
or against the cogency or truth value of propositions, though interfaith 
dialogue must go beyond the propositional level to the experiential level 
and to the recognition that much lies beyond language and metaphysics. 
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Therefore, I disagree with Gross’s statement that the long-term relations 
between different faiths and cultures are not fostered through the process 
of debate.  
She advocates “developing empathetic understanding of those who   
are very different from oneself than by debate about whose position is 
superior.” However, she does not elaborate how this “empathic under-
standing” is to be achieved without first debating and arguing proposi-
tions and truth-claims with an open mind. Being Different is clearly going 
beyond the laissez-faire attitude that says, “You have your point of view 
and I have mine.”  
The West itself stands to gain a great deal from being gazed at by an 
external lens—just as a psychologist’s external lens can provide the client 
with new insights into himself. The Dharma family of worldviews is 
arguably the most sophisticated outside the West which can lend itself to 
the purpose of providing an external critique. Such an external gaze is 
never comfortable.  
 
Prior Attempts are Inadequate 
Yelle rightly makes the point that Indian postcolonial scholarship already 
reverses the gaze on the West. But he fails to note that most such scholars 
have adopted Western theories and vocabularies (in part presumably 
because they depend on Western funding and institutions for their careers), 
and that they often simply lack adequate knowledge of and sympathy 
with their own native siddhånta (theories) to use as an alternative point 
from which to launch their critique. Their criticisms of the West do not 
qualify as legitimate p¨rvapak‚a through dharmic lenses in the sense that 
I am speaking of; rather they should be seen as part of the Western 
tradition of self-critique. This critique, I appreciate, is quite extensive 
and useful, but it is not a substitute for critiques rooted in a non-Western 
axiomatic system.  
I am aware of scholarship that uses categories indigenous to India (for 
example, A.K. Ramanujan, McKim Marriott and Ronald Inden), but such 
scholarship has only looked at India—not back at the West. To decolonize 
oneself by looking at oneself through one’s native categories is a necessary 
first step, but it is not sufficient if the goal is to bring these categories into 
play in the global discourse. One’s lens must also be able to offer new 
insights into other cultures, thus inspiring alternative modes of thinking. 
374  /  Rajiv Malhotra 
That is where Being Different seeks to extend the conversation. 
As referenced in Being Different, one work that does go in this direction 
using Buddhist terms is David Loy’s study of Western civilization. He 
looks at the West in terms of its profound sense of lack, which he com-
pares to the Buddhist sense of dukkha. There are also intimations of this 
reversal of the gaze in the thought of M.K. Gandhi (for example, his 
seminal “Hind Swaraj” written a century ago) and Çr< Aurobindo. They 
have been profound catalysts for my own thought, and I believe they and 
others like them could be re-visited. 
I locate Being Different alongside the works of Christian theologians 
Raimundo Panikkar and Jacques Dupuis. Their works compare and con-
trast the same entities that Being Different addresses. Yet, unlike Yelle’s 
criticism of Being Different, there is no charge alleging these scholars to 
have essentialized Dharma, or to have ignored the existence of social 
problems within Christianity (which is their faith), or to have put forward 
a reductionist representation of Christianity. Nor have these scholars 
made any attempt to conceal their explicitly Christian standpoint. Yet 
their scholarship has never been criticized on the basis that they did not 
maintain “neutrality.” They faced the same methodological challenges as 
I do, in terms of determining a precise level of abstraction within which 
to frame their arguments and in selecting the characteristic features of 
Hinduism and Christianity that were sufficiently wide as to underpin a 
meaningful comparative exercise. Similar exercises from a dharmic per-
spective, and employing a parallel methodology, should therefore be 
encouraged. My book is a start in that direction. 
 
Dharma’s Integral Unity 
 
When a dharmic lens is offered as a strong and relatively unified perspec-
tive, one faces a huge outcry from those parts of the academy that have 
assumed the role of mediator between Dharma and the West. This outrage, 
implicit in many of the essays in this issue, often takes the form of the 
charge of essentialism.  
Yelle and Larson in particular make this claim, and Cleo Kearns also 
notes that I seem to be reinstating a binary dynamic and thus freezing 
debate. Gier asserts that Being Different claims an Indian universalism, 
and writes: “An Indian universalism would be just as problematic as the 
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Euro-American variety has been.” However, Being Different does not 
propose an alternative universalism. I clarify at the outset that I employ 
Dharma as a foil against which to pose its view of Western Universalism. 
The technique of gaze reversal does not necessarily imply that the one 
who is now gazing is making his own claim to universalism. I reject any 
universalism, be it of an American, European or Indian variety. 
Larson seeks to preempt the gaze reversal by undermining the coherence 
of a positive sense of Dharma. We clearly hold opposing views on the 
question of whether there is a dharmic civilization that is characterized 
by coherence and integral unity. Larson contends that any assertion of 
dharmic unity must necessarily impose homogeneity. I will explain below 
why Larson is incorrect. 
 
Integral Unity is Not Homogeneity 
Being Different’s position is that multiple Dharma systems can each   
have integral unity and yet have different and even incompatible 
metaphysics. The fact that each has integrality and yet is distinct from 
the rest is akin to several different objects being yellow—that is, the 
common quality of yellowness gives a family resemblance without 
making all the yellow objects the same. A more direct analogy is as 
follows: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share the characteristic of 
reliance upon historical prophets, without all the prophetic revelations 
being homogeneous. Their family resemblance is that prophetic revela-
tions in history are the ultimate means to access religious truth, and yet 
there is immense diversity within the family. One could identify the very 
distinct systems of Judaic, Christian, and Islamic prophetism; one might 
even discern sub-branches such as Mormon and Ahmaddiya prophetism. 
Gier’s criticism that Being Different somehow reduces all Indian belief 
systems into a single homogeneity is equivalent to an argument that by 
demonstrating the differences between Judaism and Christianity, one 
claims to have debunked their shared principle of prophetic revelation.  
An integral unity, likewise, may be expressed through Mådhyamika, 
Advaita, Viçi‚†ådvaita, Tantra, Aurobindo and many other forms, each of 
which is distinct. Being Different goes to great lengths to explain that 
different Dharma systems disagree on many key points, yet each adheres 
to the common standard of integral unity proposed in the book. 
Yelle is right when he says that, “Every tradition is in fact an amalgam, 
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and retains the traces of its composite origins.” But he is wrong when he 
argues against my use of common features such as integral unity and 
embodied knowing, calling these “a thoroughly modern and homogenized 
ideal of Hinduism drawn from certain aspects of Vedånta philosophy and 
Yoga.” His concern about homogenization would have been legitimate if 
Being Different had proposed an integration of all Dharma traditions into 
a single new tradition. This is simply not my goal. Looking for common-
ality as a standpoint from which to gaze at a different family does not 
require us to relinquish the internal distinctiveness among the members 
of either family. 
In summary, integral unity differs from homogeneity by two cardinal 
criteria. First, integral unity does not mandate that any integral system 
need be homogeneous internally, and in fact the integral unity itself 
implies built-in multiplicity of certain kinds. This invalidates the claims 
that I advocate undifferentiated unity. Second, integral unity does not 
imply that every integral system must be in agreement with every other 
integral system on all matters. This invalidates the claim that I represent 
all Dharma systems as being the same. 
 
Charge of Fragmentation 
Once the reader is convinced that there is merit in a Dharma-specific gaze 
at the West, then it follows that we need a coherent dharmic place from 
which to start. For if Dharma is a mere random scattering of incoherent 
exotica, there could be no such place from which gazing at the West 
would be feasible. The concept of the “West” as a unified entity has been 
made very robust over a long time, despite recent attempts by postcolo-
nialists to deconstruct it. On the other hand, Dharma is portrayed as inter-
nally fragmented, divisive and oppressive, to such an extent that it is 
made to appear that it lacks any coherent position that is worthy. Hence 
the very ground from which one might offer a dharmic gaze is depicted 
as shaky and fabricated.  
Though Larson also makes this charge of fragmentation, it is Gier who 
takes the lead. He writes: “Malhotra himself admits that there are ‘profound 
differences in theory and practice’ in the Dharma traditions, so this under-
mines his principal claim that these philosophical schools are ‘integral’.” 
Gier’s misinterpretation, here, arises from his having confused “integral” 
with “homogeneous,” a point I have already clarified earlier. 
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Larson argues that the refutation of permanent substance by Buddhist 
cosmology undermines the notion of integral unity. But Being Different 
explains how Mådhyamika Buddhism has integral unity even though its 
version differs from Hindu schools. Appendix A in Being Different 
elaborates the applicability of certain Dharma tenets across a variety of 
traditions, including Mådhyamika, Jaina, Tantra and Kashmir Çaiva. 
Larson seems to have assumed that integral unity is a theistic notion, and 
thus ignores my conscious definition of the term for applicability to either 
theistic or non-theistic contexts. Moreover, in the course of his critique, 
Larson attempts to support his argument by offering an interpretation of 
Någårjuna that verges on nihilism; in so doing, he illustrates precisely the 
sort of reductive trap that Being Different seeks to avoid. 
To support his position that Patañjali’s system is not integral, Gier cites 
statements by Western authors who claim that the meditation techniques 
it employs are Buddhist. However, several Buddhist scholars affirm that 
Buddha himself used numerous techniques practiced by Sanåtana Dharma 
as stepping stones to achieve his nirvå~a. Evidently, Gier is trying to 
strengthen his thesis that cross-borrowings among Indian schools are of 
the same synthetic variety as the cross-borrowings that occurred between 
Hebraic and Hellenistic systems. This, of course, completely ignores the 
bitter legacy of historical tensions and philosophical contradictions 
between Hebraism and Hellenism: a syndrome characteristic of synthetic 
unity. Being Different discusses this point at length. In one particularly 
abstruse passage Gier writes: “Malhotra notes that Buddhism understands 
unity ‘in a radically different way than in Vedånta.’ If this is so, then 
Buddhism cannot be considered a ‘constituent or component’ of Vedånta.” 
However, nowhere have I ever attempted to construe Buddhism as a 
constituent or component of Vedånta. 
In his desire to present Indian civilization as fragmented, Gier writes, 
“Contrary to all the Indian schools, the Buddha …,” thus implying that 
Buddhism is somehow non-Indian. Indeed, it is common among some 
Western scholars to emphasize a de-Indianized Buddhism and to focus 
on the mutual tensions, rather than the synergy, between Hinduism and 
Buddhism. Clearly, Gier’s insistence that the traditions of India cannot 
be seen as unified at any level reinforces my contention that the Western 
lens is programmed to look for incoherence in Indian civilization. Asser-
tions of dharmic coherence are therefore considered troubling. 
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Mistranslation and Misunderstanding of Mithyå 
A major problem with Gier’s position, as with many modern interpreta-
tions of Dharma, concerns a persistent mistranslation and misunder-
standing of the word mithyå. As used in the context of Vedånta, mithyå  
is often wrongly translated as “illusion.” Similarly, the words sat and 
asat are respectively mistranslated as “real” and “unreal.” This, in fact, 
reflects a limitation of the English language in failing to allow for a 
category that is between “real” and “unreal.” 
Such a limitation precipitates the conflation of asat and mithyå (both 
being mistranslated as “unreal”), making it impossible to conceive of 
mithyå as a type of reality different than either sat or asat. This seriously 
flawed understanding of basic Vedånta terminology has fed the miscon-
ception that Çakara regards the world as illusory, which in turn feeds 
the stereotype of a worldview predicated on otherworldliness, social 
irresponsibility, fatalism and the like.  
It is this very misconception which causes Gier to conclude that, “If 
Malhotra believes that organic unity of self, cosmos and God is essential 
to the Dharma tradition, then Çakara does not meet that criterion.” Gier 
makes this sweeping statement relying unduly upon Lance Nelson’s 
secondary scholarship. He states: “Nelson contends that Advaita Vedånta 
achieves its non-duality ‘exclusively not inclusively’ such that disunity 
rather than unity with the world is the result.…Nelson shows that the 
Advaitin imputes no value whatsoever to the natural world and by impli-
cation, none to the social world either” (emphasis added). Gier cannot 
claim to effect a dismissal of such magnitude simply through a casual 
citation, while failing to provide a single substantive argument of his 
own in support. 
Kristen L. Southworth in “Hindu Worldview and Ecological Engage-
ment” (2010) vehemently disagrees with Nelson’s “world negating” 
homogeneity theory of Vedånta. She writes: 
 
Lance Nelson has tried to make a strong argument that the Advaita 
Vedanta tradition, which has been dominant both in numbers and 
prestige for more than 1000 years, “encourages attitudes of devaluation 
and neglect of the natural universe.”  
Yet Nelson seems to confuse ideas that ascetic monks commit them-
selves to in order to reach a state of liberation with a description of the 
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nature of liberation. In other words, he confuses the means with the 
end. His criticisms are centered on textual examples of exercises that 
are meant to encourage disgust towards all things worldly among prac-
ticing ascetics. For the ascetic monk seeking pure Selfhood, a process 
of total renunciation is indeed needed. But these are not practices 
intended for everyone, nor are they doctrines describing the character 
of liberation. We might note here, as well, that this process of worldly 
denial in order to gain spiritual maturity is certainly not unique to 
Hinduism. 
In fact, within Christianity we find some of the most striking theolog-
ical rejections of “this world,” along with a focus on a resurrected life 
in another world. For many, resurrection is representative that the end 
goal is the afterlife, and this has become the most central tenet of the 
faith for many people, one which has given rise to a consistent ethical 
dilemma throughout Christian history: why should I work to improve 
conditions in this world when my home is ultimately elsewhere? In 
many popular Christian cosmologies, this “other world” is seen as 
utterly elsewhere, entirely separate from this world. As such, ascetic 
monks and lay Christians alike have, throughout history, struggled to 
find the motivation to engage in restorative social efforts that bring 
about positive change in this world. I think we should be very careful 
about applying the same cosmology of salvation, and thus the same 
problem, to Hinduism (Southworth 2010: 4). 
 
The conception of reality in Vedånta is always comparative. Relative to a 
particular material, an object made out of that material is considered 
“less real.” For example, a bucket made out of plastic is unreal relative to 
the plastic itself. This is elucidated in the Chåndogya Upani‚ad (6.1.4) 
which explains that a clay pot is in fact name-and-form (nåmar¨pa) 
taken on by clay, so that the clay pot is not real, independent of the clay. 
A cause is thus considered to be “more real” than its effect, because the 
reality of an effect depends upon its cause. It follows that anything which 
has a material and/or efficient cause can be described as mithyå: a depen-
dent reality. The “cause of the world” is thus ascribed a greater degree of 
reality than the world itself. When we say that the universe is mithyå, we 
mean that it is unreal when seen as an independent reality; however, it is 
surely real when seen as brahman, its cause. 
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Çakara’s Bhå‚ya on Bådaråya~a’s Brahmas¨tra is an important source 
on this matter, arguing that 
 
omniscient and omnipotent source must be brahman from which occurs 
the birth, continuance, and dissolution of this universe that is manifested 
through name and form, that is associated with diverse agents and 
experiences, that provides the support for action and results, having 
well-regulated space, time and causation, and that defies all thoughts 
about the real nature of its creation (1.1.2; Svåmi Gamb>rånanda’s 
translation). 
 
As this should clarify, Çakara does not describe the universe as being 
anything even remotely close to illusory; indeed, it is the organic unity 
encompassing the Universe, its diverse agents, and its experiences that 
Çakara terms brahman. This excerpt also indicates what Çakara means 
by mithyå: “that [which] defies all thoughts about the real nature of its 
creation.” Svåmi Bhajånanda explains it as follows: 
 
The Advaitin concludes that the world is different from both sat and 
asat; it is sad-asad-vilak‚a~a. Such a fact defies the laws of [ordinary] 
logical thinking; hence, it is anirvacanya. Another word used in the 
same sense is mithyå. In common parlance mithyå means illusion or 
falsehood, but in Advaita Vedanta it means something “mysterious” 
(2010: 6). 
 
To understand mithyå correctly in relation to sat and asat, one must 
appreciate that sat is that which does not depend upon anything else for 
its existence, mithyå is that which depends upon something else for its 
existence and asat is that which cannot have existence. The profound 
points of distinction between these Sanskrit terms become blurred by 
mistranslation into Western languages that simply cannot support the 
categories they wish to appropriate, leading ultimately to distortions such 
as those provided by Nelson and reproduced by Gier. 
 
Integral Unity in Systems other than Advaita Vedånta 
Råmånuja’s Viçi‚†ådvaita, which is distinctively different from Advaita, 
ultimately also presents a view of the universe predicated on integral unity 
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as defined in Being Different. To understand Viçi‚†ådvaita accurately, 
one must first appreciate the specific contours of Råmånuja’s approach. 
In contrast to Çakara, Råmånuja maintains that brahman cannot be 
imagined as nirgu~a or nirviçe‚a (devoid of attributes). In support of this, 
he divides Vedic passages into two categories: abheda-çruti, passages that 
negate difference, suggesting that brahman is without any internal distinc-
tions (examples are Chåndogya Upani‚ad 3.14.1; Må~¨kya Upani‚ad 
3.2), and bheda-çruti, passages that uphold difference, suggesting that 
internal distinctions exist within brahman (Çvetåçvatara Upani‚ad 1.9; 
Ka†ha Upani‚ad 2.2.13).  
Råmånuja does not consider these two categories as contradicting each 
other; indeed, he declares emphatically that both are true. The apparent 
contradiction between them is resolved and harmonized by another cate-
gory called gha†aka-çruti, exemplified by the antaryåmi brahma passage 
of the B®hadåra~yaka Upani‚ad which explains that all sentient and non-
sentient beings relate to brahman in the same manner as the body relates 
to the indweller; a relationship it calls pradhåna-pratitantram. Råmånuja 
emphasizes B®hadåra~yaka Upani‚ad 3.3–22 in order to establish the true 
nature of the three tattvas—'çvara (Lord), cit (consciousness) and acit 
(matter)—that form an integral unity called çar'ra-çar'ri (body-indweller). 
The essence of çar'ra-çar'ri doctrine is that while çar'ra and çar'ri are 
real, çar'ra depends inseparably upon çar'ri. Just as the physical body 
inseparably depends upon çar'ri, so cit depends inseparably upon 'çvara 
for its existence. Brahman alone is ultimately independent. Integral unity, 
therefore, is clearly established and upheld in the precepts of Viçi‚†ådvaita. 
Thus, the systems of Çakara and Råmånuja are each characterized by 
integral unity, albeit in different ways and despite other major disagree-
ments between them. Çakara’s system proposes the integral unity by 
explaining that mithyå is not a separable, self-sustaining entity, but 
depends upon underlying brahman for its existence. Råmånuja, likewise, 
posits the integral unity of brahman as antaryåmi; a foundational quality 
inherent within all that exists. 
Shrinivas Tilak’s essay provides further arguments to support my expla-
nation of integral unity as it applies to each of a variety of dharmic systems. 
For example: 
(i) In the case of Hinduism, Tilak explains integrality separately in    
the texts of bhedåbheda, Vedånta, Så7khya, Vaiçe‚ika, M;må7så and 
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Patañjali’s Yogas¨tra. Indeed these systems are not presented as homo-
geneous in Being Different, but as each possessing its own metaphysics 
of integrality.  
(ii) He reminds us that in Buddhism there is no personal supreme 
being, such as brahman, #çvara, Vi‚~u or Çiva. Dyadic contrasts are 
avoided by emphasizing the mutual interdependence of all entities, which 
is Buddhism’s notion of integral unity. The fundamental principle of 
dependent co-origination (prat#tya-samutpåda) indicates that any entity 
or process exists in mutual relation to all other entities and processes. 
This web or network of causation involves relations with feedback as in 
systems theory and may be seen as ontological as well as epistemologi-
cal. This principle is called the absence of essences (ç¨nyatå), meaning 
that nothing—not an idea, feeling, emotion and certainly not a physical 
object—exists ultimately as a separable entity. Clearly, this satisfies the 
definition of integral unity whilst being different from the Hindu systems. 
(iii) The Jaina idea of anekåntavåda is that a given viewpoint (naya), 
while legitimate in itself, cannot claim to be complete or exclude other 
viewpoints, even those that seem to contradict it. The Tattvårthas¨tra 
typically divides a naya into substantial and modal, and what is affirmed 
from one viewpoint appears unreal from the other. Thus, from the modal 
perspective things necessarily originate and perish, while from a substan-
tial perspective there is neither origination nor destruction. No “thing” 
can be seen in separation and isolation. 
(iv) I find his suggestion that the Sikh notion of integrality may be 
understood through musical mode (based on råga, tåla and ghar) as a 
key organization principle in the Ådi Granth most creative. He explains 
how this text is itself an embodiment of integrality.  
After showing how a variety of separate kinds of integral unity are 
found in the dharmic systems, Tilak argues that the notion of integral 
unity may be taken a step further and applied to the relationships among 
the four major Dharma traditions. As one example of what they share, he 
demonstrates how the non-translatable categories of prajñå, prå~a and 
prapaca, among others, serve as a common denominator in diverse 
cognitive, metaphysical and spiritual systems that comprise and consti-
tute these traditions.  
The four Dharma systems also share these general presuppositions: They 
all lead to the transcendent principle expressed variously as brahman, 
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nirvå~a and kevala; they facilitate the attainment of an extraordinary and 
direct experience (such as the highest yogic samådhi), leading to the 
realization of the transcendent principle at the personal level (sometimes 
even at the embodied level as j!vanamukta or avalokateçvara); and they 
facilitate a harmonious relation between the phenomenal and material 
mode of life (sa såra) with the goal of spiritual liberation (paramårtha) 
variously. They all share praxis, including symbols, foods, customs, social 
values, sacred geography, family values, festivals and so on. 
To further illustrate the point that Tilak is making, Hindus, Jainas and 
Sikhs would have no objection to the formulation of the nature of dharma 
as understood in terms of the famous Buddhist eightfold path. All would 
agree that it involves the following elements: prajnå, correct view, inten-
tion and speech, corresponding to orthodoxy; ç!la, correct action, liveli-
hood and effort, corresponding to orthopraxy; and samådhi, correct mind-
fulness and concentration, corresponding to yogic methodology. 
Tilak goes on to explain that a given word or linguistic expression is 
not the monopoly of any one dharmic tradition or language. The well-
established Vedic method of bandhutå is used to demonstrate the common 
ground and themes of Dharma shared by all schools. Each Dharma tradi-
tion retells anecdotes and narratives using its own symbolism, the real 
meaning of which lies in a truth to which the symbols point. 
 
Defending the Principle of Mantras 
While Being Different cites Sanskrit mantras as a major principle with 
no Western equivalent and refers to classical Indian grammarians and 
philosophers, Yelle rejects the notion of Sanskrit non-translatables. He 
calls it “a nativist ideology,” “nothing more nor less than ethnolinguistic 
chauvinism,” and dismisses it as “magical thinking.” Let me first say that 
the philosophy of mantra non-translatability does not rest on Sanskrit 
being “superior” to other languages. Furthermore, Yelle makes no attempt 
to address the Indian classical theories of language, sound and grammar 
that I cite, but rather relies entirely upon Western philosophy, stating that 
“one of the basic premises of modern, Western views of language, at 
least since John Locke, is that language is arbitrary. This idea has now 
been firmly established, with very few exceptions, in modern linguistic 
science.” I question his axiomatic usage of what he regards as modern 
linguistic “science” and Western philosophy. This confident acceptance 
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of received doctrine illustrates why my project has merit, for without the 
ability to step outside the Western system and reverse the gaze, views 
such as Locke’s on the nature of language would remain unchallenged.  
Yelle’s rejection of Sanskrit’s sophisticated theory of mantras in effect 
also dismisses the theory of four levels of våc that is at the heart of 
Kashmir Çaiva, Tantra and several other Dharma schools. The literature 
on this is vast. Moreover, Yelle fails to appreciate that non-translatability 
resists reductionism and demands “thick descriptions”—and hence sus-
tains diversity. Nor does he bother to tackle even one of the numerous 
examples cited in chapter 5 of Being Different, where common transla-
tions are shown to be misleading and reductionist.  
 
Is Western Civilization Unified in the Same Manner? 
 
A corollary to Yelle’s claim that I want internal homogeneity among the 
schools of Dharma, is his argument that Being Different is artificially 
overstating the differences between the Dharma and Abrahamic sides of 
the comparison: 
 
One unstated goal of Malhotra’s project seems to be to identify the so-
called Abrahamic traditions—the monotheistic traditions stemming 
from the Hebrew Bible—as both essentially similar to each other and 
essentially different from dharmic traditions.…In hastening to high-
light the differences between Western and dharmic traditions, Malhotra 
frequently exaggerates those differences and neglects the many points 
of commonality.  
 
This goal is, in fact, not “unstated” but explicit, for only by maximizing 
the distance can we have such a mutual p¨rvapak‚a and uttaråpak‚a. 
There are definitely many points of commonality, but other areas of com-
monality have been frequently based upon misinterpretations, and Being 
Different offers a corrective to precisely this problem. 
Kearns also criticizes Being Different along these lines, though in a 
slightly different way. She argues that in positing a sharp divide between 
dharmic and Abrahamic perspectives, I am falling into precisely the kind 
of binary anxiety to which Western thought is prey, rather than the “flow-
ing, embracive, relaxed sensibility” that allows Dharma to be multiple 
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without losing coherence. Indeed I have struggled with this, and con-
cluded that the principle of skillful means is applicable here: the method-
ology adopted cannot be taken literally, but must be seen as a device to 
serve a certain purpose.  
In all Dharma systems a provisional reality must be taken seriously in 
order to function in this world, even when the ultimate goal is to transcend 
it. The metaphor of the raft is often given: one must use the raft to cross 
the river, knowing fully well that the raft is to be abandoned at a later 
time. I have developed these binaries between Dharma systems and the 
West as skillful means to highlight the gaze from the dharmic lens that 
has not received its due—that is, as a corrective; and these are not 
intended as some kind of absolute essences. If I were to remain stuck in 
such binaries and not be able to move after I have clarified the dynamics 
between these poles, my project would indeed be self-defeating. 
Being Different finds the postmodernist deconstructions of the West 
inadequate because they lack any coherent alternative worldview as the 
source of gazing. This means that after decentering the West they leave a 
vacuum, which is why the postmodernist project has all but collapsed. 
We must search for positive principles of coherence that are realistic and 
useful for the purpose of this project. Also, Being Different addresses 
that Western civilization displays a merely synthetic and precarious unity, 
and this is for reasons that lie deep in its fragmentary cosmology and its 
insistence on historical revelation as the basis for religious life.  
 
Challenging Panentheism as Western 
Gier relies heavily upon the contention that in developing the philosophy 
of panentheism, Charles Hartshorne and Alfred North Whitehead provide 
a basis for substantiating Western claims to having integral (as opposed 
to synthetic) unity. However, as I shall explain in some detail, Gier’s con-
tention ignores the unmistakably Indian origins of the philosophy imported 
and reformulated as “panentheism” by these Western philosophers. (I 
should clarify that panentheism—with the middle syllable “en”—refers 
to a unified concept of the world as God and simultaneously God as 
transcendent. This conception of God’s dual character is central to 
integral unity in the theistic Dharma systems. God is the unchangeable 
transcendent; God also constitutes everything that exists, and hence is 
ever in flux. This concept is not to be confused with “pantheism”—
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without the middle syllable “en”—exemplified by the nature worship 
that is characteristic of many pagan faiths, the difference being that 
pantheism lacks the notion of a transcendent God.) 
Given the central place accorded to Hartshorne and Whitehead in Gier’s 
arguments, it is important that I provide further evidence that both men 
borrow heavily from Indian thought, even though they tended to credit 
only Western thinkers for supplying the building blocks and inspiration 
for their views. Successive generations of Westerners have turned these 
ideas into original “Western” thought and washed away their Indian sources 
to conceal evidence of the appropriation.  
Gier states that the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause 
coined the term “panentheism” in 1828. Many Western accounts note 
this coinage as if it were a wholesale invention, ignoring the fact that 
Krause was a serious scholar of Sanskrit who employed Sanskrit texts to 
develop and argue his ideas. These ideas departed from the work of his 
predecessors J.G. Fichte, F.W.J. Schelling, and Hegel. German historians 
of nineteenth-century philosophy will know that it was from Sanskrit 
sources that Krause derived the notion which he eventually introduced 
into German philosophy as “panentheism.” In fact, he influenced Arthur 
Schopenhauer, who did not know Sanskrit and relied upon Krause for his 
access to Indian texts; indeed Krause is also said to have introduced 
Schopenhauer to Indian techniques of meditation. In his article “Eastern 
Principles within Western Metaphysics: Krause and Schopenhauer’s 
Reception of Indian Philosophy,” Claus Dierksmeier sketches “how… 
[Krause] incorporated some elements of Upanishadic and Vedantic 
speculation into his system. In particular,…[Dierksmeier] emphasize[s] 
Krause’s ‘panentheistic’ conception of the absolute being…and how it 
facilitates an ‘open’ dialectics that compares favorably with the dialectics 
of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel” (2008: 63).  
Second, with respect to the question of whether panentheism is indige-
nous to the West and represents the culminating unification of its various 
tendencies, Gier says that I am wrong to claim that Hartshorne obtained 
the idea of panentheism from India. But there is compelling evidence that 
he derived his view from Indian Vai‚~ava philosophers. This evidence is 
as follows:  
(i) Hartshorne himself acknowledged that panentheism was a concept 
alien to traditional Christian theology, wherein the notions of monotheism 
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and pantheism were considered to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
For instance, in his Philosophers Speak of God (1953: 1), he introduces 
panentheism contrasting it with monotheism and pantheism. 
(ii) He published several detailed and extensive studies of Indian philos-
ophers and explicitly referred to them as panentheistic thinkers. For 
instance, in Philosophers Speak of God, on pages 178–79, he refers to 
Råmånuja as quasi-panentheist and JHva GosvåmH as a full-fledged panen-
theist. In The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy 
(1997: 39), Hartshorne speaks of JHva GosvåmH’s school anticipating 
process theology by two centuries. Also, in response to John E. Smith’s 
chapter, “Some Aspects of Hartshorne’s Treatment of Anselm” (1984), 
Hartshorne refers to JHva GosvåmH as a panentheist. 
(iii) He went on to have contact with later Indian thinkers of the same 
tradition, especially through Mahanambrata Brahmachari, a Vai‚~ava 
monk from the lineage of JHva GosvåmH. Brahmachari attended the Uni-
versity of Chicago from 1934–37, earning a doctorate in philosophy for a 
dissertation entitled “The Philosophy of ÇrH JHva GosvåmH.” Hartshorne, 
who was a professor of philosophy at Chicago (1928–55), worked with 
Brahmacari over that period.1 
(iv) Contemporary scholars and theologians, including John C. Plott 
(1953), Julius J. Lipner (1986), John B. Carman (1994) and Keith Ward 
(2009), have affirmed without reservation the panentheistic credentials of 
Råmånuja.  
(v) Panentheism has been a foundational component of many schools 
of Indian thought, including the Viçi‚†ådvaita philosophy of Råmånuja, 
the GauHya Vai‚~avism of Caitanya Mahåprabhu and the diverse tradi-
tions of Tantra and Kashmir Çaiva, all of which predate Hartshorne by 
several centuries.  
After studying and writing on Råmånuja’s metaphysical system for 
many decades, Hartshorne became dissatisfied with what he considered 
as the “incompleteness” of the Indian philosopher’s panentheism, which 
he attributed to Råmånuja’s failure to fully apply the principle of dipolarity 
with regard to divine nature. This supposed “shortcoming” should, in 
fact, be ascribed to Hartshorne’s own rigid and forced over-application 
of Whitehead’s dipolarity principle. Neither Råmånuja nor JHva GosvåmH 
entertained any a priori notion of dipolarity, and neither was constrained 
by it. These Indian panentheistic thinkers remained free to maintain the 
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transcendence-qua-immanence of divinity through the principle of the 
universe-as-the-body-of-brahman, while also upholding the goodness 
and accessibility of the Lord (K®‚~a). Ultimately, in order to preserve the 
“goodness” of his own deity, Hartshorne was obliged to compromise his 
adherence to the dipolarity principle on the question of whether evil is 
applicable to God. Hartshorne’s assimilation of Indian panentheistic 
concepts is therefore hobbled by the traditional rigidity of Western logical 
frameworks such as dipolarity, even though dipolarity was itself designed 
to ameliorate the inflexibility of Christian monotheism.  
Gier also states that “the rationalist Hartshorne breaks with Gosvåm> 
on the question of divine revelation as the primary source of knowledge” 
(emphasis added). Was Hartshorne a “rationalist” simply because he 
applied dipolarism to Christianity? To merely superimpose a logical 
category on a doctrine rooted in revelation does not alter the fundamental 
dependence of that doctrine upon revelation: a primary determinant of 
the dogmatic character of Christianity. Regardless of whether the notion 
of dipolarism is derived from Whitehead or Råmånuja or J>va Gosvåm>, 
the fact remains that such a category fits poorly with the underlying 
monotheism of Christianity. Any “rationality” ascribed to Hartshorne, or 
to any Christian theologian by virtue of having employed such a category, 
must necessarily be superficial; ultimately, their arguments are circular   
in character and resort to biblical history-centric revelation as the final 
authority.2 
In comparison, J>va Gosvåm> has far more in common with rationalists 
and empiricists, since he gives priority to experience (anubh¨ti) and reason 
(yukti)—rather than to revelation. Whilst Hartshorne’s theology is purely 
theoretical and speculative, lacking reference to any credible practice 
equivalent to yoga or sådhana, all Dharma systems including that of J>va 
Gosvåm> are rooted in direct experience and are therefore open to verifica-
tion. Rather than Hartshorne, it is J>va Gosvåm> who ought to be con-
sidered a rationalist for his advocacy of reason as a primary means of 
knowledge and an experientialist-empiricist for having accorded first 
place to experience in his epistemology.3 
Thus, J>va Gosvåm>’s approach is predominantly “rational” because 
from the triad of valid means of knowledge (pramå~a) that J>va Gosvåm> 
describes, his epistemology prioritizes experience and reason over revela-
tion. Significantly, çruti, loosely translated as “revelation,” is listed third 
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in the triad of pramå~as, not first. This order of precedence, in itself, 
renders implausible Gier’s contention that J>va Gosvåm>’s theology is 
derived primarily from revelation. I emphasize this point specifically 
because the central, even foundational, role of experience and reason in 
Indian soteriological systems is rarely recognized by Western critics, 
presumably because it would undermine the myth of “rational West and 
mythical East.” Gier’s charge represents a distortion introduced by pro-
jecting the Christian theological epistemology of faith and revelation 
onto Indian philosophy. 
Clearly, and contrary to what Gier would have us believe, the debt   
that Hartshorne’s formulation of panentheism owes first to Råmånuja’s 
Viçi‚†ådvaita and subsequently to J>va Gosvåm>’s Acintya-bhedåbheda-
vedånta is huge. Furthermore, Gier is seriously in error when he states 
that Hartshorne “was most impressed by Bengali Vai‚~ava theologian 
J>va Gosvåm>.” It is Råmånuja, not J>va Gosvåm>, whose work Hartshorne 
has publicly admitted to being “impressed by.” In fact, while Hartshorne’s 
writings over many decades include extensive analyses of Råmånuja, 
they mention J>va Gosvåm> far less.4 
 
Buddhist Origins of Process Philosophy 
Gier’s assertion that Western civilization has moved beyond a merely 
synthetic unity is also heavily based on his reading of Whitehead and on 
what has come to be called the “constructive postmodernism” of contem-
porary process philosophers, of which he supposes I am ignorant. But he 
fails to highlight the relationship between such Western philosophies and 
Indian schools of thought. A century ago, many Western thinkers were 
quite open in acknowledging the Indian sources of their ideas; nowadays 
over the course of successive intellectual movements, this acknowledg-
ment has been lost in the repackaging of Indian ideas into newly invented 
terms such “process philosophy” and “constructive postmodernism.”  
Buddhism was very much in vogue in the late Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain of Whitehead’s day, and both he and his pupil, Bertrand Russell, 
studied it with interest. Whitehead was undeniably impressed and influ-
enced by its ideas. “Buddhism,” he once wrote, “is the most colossal 
example in the history of applied metaphysics” (cited in Verhoeven 2001: 
88). 
In the heyday of Whitehead’s tenure at Cambridge, many leading British 
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intellectuals were strongly influenced by Abhidharma philosophy, a 
hallmark of the Theravåda school of Buddhism. Among such scholars 
were Thomas and Caroline Rhys Davids, who produced much literature 
on the subject. As early as 1910, the Pali Text Society published the 
Compendium of Philosophy, U. Shwe Zan Aung’s English translation of 
Åcariya Anuruddha’s Abhidhammattha Sagaha, with an illuminating 
introductory essay by Caroline Rhys Davids. At Harvard, too, Whitehead’s 
tenure was contemporaneous with the firm establishment of Buddhist 
studies, which covered the various traditions of Indian and Far Eastern 
Buddhism (Chinese and Japanese Mahåyåna).  
It is not surprising, then, to find extensive correlations between Buddhism 
and Whitehead’s process philosophy. These have been documented at 
length in a doctoral dissertation by Peter Kakol (2000). I too have worked 
for over a decade with specialists on Buddhism and on Whitehead to trace 
the influence of Indian ideas on the philosopher. Table 1 lists the original 
Sanskrit terms for some key Buddhist concepts, the English equivalents 
of these terms, and the terms used by Whitehead when mapping these 
concepts onto his own framework. 
What is surprising is the extent to which Whitehead withholds acknowl-
edgment of the influence of these Buddhist concepts, and instead he 
attributes the origins of his thought only to Western sources. While he 
makes vague token references to the general affinity his organic philos-
ophy has with “some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought,” he gives no 
indication of the specific origins of such extensive correlatives as are 
listed in the table. In contrast, Whitehead routinely cites ancient Greek 
philosophers such as Heraclitus as proto-proponents of the process view 
throughout his major work, Process and Philosophy (1929). G.W. 
Leibniz’s Monadology (1714) is mentioned as his inspiration for actual 
entities, and John Locke is referenced as his model for non-substantialism; 
yet all the while, his arguments remain patently Buddhist.  
Whereas the Western precedents Whitehead cites are weak analogs at 
best, the Buddhist tenets from which his system derives are clear-cut and 
immensely detailed. Indeed, it could be demonstrated that Whitehead’s 
arguments are strongest and most lucid when he remains closest to the 
original Buddhist models (even though he does not acknowledge them). 
In comparison, his contentions become vague and confusing when he 
turns to speculation and bouts of “originality” by inventing terminology 


















ç¨nyatå emptiness non-essentialism 
prat"tya-
samutpåda 
dependent arising or 
relativity relativity, nexus 
samaya occasion 
occasions of experience, 
or actual occasions, or 
actual entities 
måt®kå matrices speculative scheme 
trikåla-sat existence in the three times objective immortality 
skandha aggregate concrescence 
avidyå ignorance fallacy of misplaced concreteness 
vedanå feeling feeling 
svalak‚a~a thing-in-itself actual entity 
pråpti propinquity or pressing prehension 
paramårtha 
ultimate realty, or 
final meaning, or 
ultimate thing 
final reality, res verae 
pa††håna relations nexus 
 
 
and framework, and when he attempts to formulate his arguments into a 
general “theory of feeling” that is unsubstantiated by any experiential 
grounding on his part. 
Neither Heraclitus, Leibniz, Locke, Whitehead, nor any of the others in 
this “imagined” Western lineage claim to have tested, or used as an expe-
riential source, any rigorous system of meditation with the exactitude and 
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continuity characteristic of Dharma traditions. Whitehead’s construction, 
then, partially amounts to a collage of ideas “cut and pasted” from Bud-
dhism; it represents a purely synthetic unity of thought that cannot be 
considered primary and that certainly never supersedes Buddhism in any 
significant respect. Anyone with a genuine knowledge of Buddhism 
would find Whitehead’s attempts to claim Western philosophers as his 
sole theoretical predecessors entirely unconvincing. 
 
Is the West Synthetic? 
In the course of his argument that Western civilization is not synthetic, 
Gier also takes exception to my critique that the West conquered other 
civilizations through violence and then seized and synthesized selective 
items from their cultures. He cites violence committed by Tibetan 
Buddhists to make his case in reverse. But the worldview of Tibetan 
Buddhism did not originate as a result of armies bringing back intellec-
tual property from conquered peoples. Hence the Western and Tibetan 
instances of violence cannot be equated. The same applies to his examples 
of intense debates among various Dharma schools: he equates Indian 
debates with European military invasions of far-flung continents thousands 
of miles away from home! 
 
Before concluding this section, I would like to point out the extent to 
which illogical statements are marshaled in order to block the acknowl-
edgment of Indian influences upon the West. Being Different mentions 
the Sri Lankan Buddhist scholar Anagarika Dharmapala in the context of 
noting that William James was influenced by several dharmic sources 
including Svåmi Vivekånanda and Dharmapala (p.95). Gier writes: “It is 
ironic that Malhotra praises Dharmapala, since the latter joined Colonel 
Henry Steele Olcott in promoting ‘Protestant’ Buddhism that fueled Sri 
Lankan nationalism and religious fundamentalism.” Gier confuses obser-
vation with praise. My statement is not an appraisal of Dharmapala’s 
personal ethics, but about India’s influence on the formulation of Western 
psychology via various intermediaries like Dharmapala. That James was 
influenced by Dharmapala as a source of Buddhist knowledge is not 
undermined by Dharmapala’s character as a Sri Lankan nationalist or 
religious fundamentalist. By way of analogy, it is well known that Nazi 
rocket science influenced NASA after World War Two, but this influence 
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cannot be denied by citing the horrors of Nazism. Whether X influenced 
Y is not resolved by discussing the ethics of X. 
 
The Politics of Coherence and Incoherence 
 
Recently, I was invited to the åçrama of a prominent Hindu guru in the 
U.S., where an American professor of Hinduism was explaining what she 
considered to be biases against Hinduism in a popular American school 
textbook. The chapter on Hinduism featured impressive pictures of all 
sorts of symbols, deities and rituals, and contained factually accurate 
descriptions of a random assortment of elements associated with Hinduism. 
The professor could not pin down any specific incorrect statement in the 
chapter, yet it failed to convey any clear sense of what Hinduism actually 
meant. It would leave a student with sensory overload and an impression 
of Hinduism as being incoherent. In contrast, the chapters on all the other 
major religions started out by establishing coherent ideas of how those 
religions saw themselves followed by details presented in an organized 
manner. The bias against Hinduism was subtle but deep. 
This incident sharpened my insight into the crux of the problem I con-
front in Being Different. It helped me identify the key questions upon 
which the present debate centers: Is Hinduism (and Dharma in general) 
incoherent? Or is it in fact coherent? If it is coherent, is it of a positive 
kind that offers something of value to humanity, or is it a scourge of 
abusive practices that ought to be erased by importing “Western prog-
ress”? 
 
Charge of Incoherence 
Implicit in Larson’s essay is a view common among many Western 
scholars (and in some cases it appears to be followed almost unconsciously) 
that Dharma, and in particular Hinduism, lacks coherence of any worthy 
kind. Accordingly, Dharma can at best be “appreciated” as a mishmash 
of disparate, contradictory and mutually irreconcilable ideas and practices. 
Sociologists and anthropologists focus upon conflicts and oppression in 
modern Indian society and project their findings onto ancient Indian texts 
to show that incoherence has always been an essential characteristic of 
India. Even those scholars of religion who might otherwise show appre-
ciation of Hinduism often portray it as an exotic and unintelligible collec-
394  /  Rajiv Malhotra 
tion of peculiar practices and strange problems, reminiscent of other primi-
tive societies that were superseded by the West.  
Chapter 4 of Being Different summarizes various Western imaginings 
of a “chaotic India” to illustrate this mindset and offers a critical Indian 
response by reversing the gaze upon the West’s fixation with “order.” 
The view through the Western lens has several important consequences:  
(i) Through its assumption of a lack of internal consistency and unity 
of Dharma, the West is able to undermine any claim made on behalf of 
Dharma civilization. Any attempt to speak of such an entity in positive 
terms can be debunked by asking, “Which ‘Dharma’ are you referring 
to?,” and thereby characterizing any attempt to establish coherence as 
being flawed, chauvinistic or even dangerous.  
(ii) Coherent theories of India and its civilization are often dismissed 
by falsely alleging that any such claim must necessarily imply an impo-
sition of homogeneity. Larson makes this very allegation, but fails to 
acknowledge that Being Different repeatedly explains how the notion of 
unity in Dharma is based on internal diversity and not on internal homo-
geneity. As a corollary to the Western denial of a coherent foundation 
common across Indian schools of thought, there is the conclusion that 
Indians ought to simply deny themselves any unified positive identity 
based on their own past and must instead seek a common identity based 
on importing modern Western principles to an even greater extent than 
they already have. (The reader may note that this is hardly distinguishable 
from the “civilizing mission” of colonialism.) The very notion of a 
classical Indian civilization is seen as a disease, and the Western scholar 
is presented as a physician to cure Indians from it. 
(iii) My earlier book, Breaking India: Western Interventions in Dravi-
dian and Dalit Faultlines (Malhotra and Neelakandan 2011), shows how 
such discourse on the fragmentation of India has been used to stir up 
internal divisiveness and conflict—ironically, in the name of “human 
rights.” (The jury is still out on whether attempts to impose Western 
universalism upon Islamic nations will empower their citizenry with 
human rights or simply destroy them through the incitement of infighting, 
while positioning the West to better control their natural resources.) 
(iv) Those few individuals who articulate Indian coherence must, 
therefore, be characterized as dangerous people by smearing them with 
allegations of fascism, identity politics and links to atrocities; or at the 
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very least, by tagging them with nonsensical labels such as “Bråhma~ical 
Neo-Hindus” as Larson does. 
(v) The characterization of Dharma as incoherent serves to protect 
Western hegemony. As noted earlier, the intellectual sophistication of 
Dharma offers a vantage point from which to decenter the West and its 
claim of universalism. Since this would pose a grave threat to Western 
universalism, it becomes important to undermine the legitimacy of Dharma 
as a coherent position from which to gaze upon the West. 
 
Digesting “Incoherent” India into the “Coherent” West 
The argument of incoherence is used to justify the fragmentation and 
repackaging of Dharma so that it becomes a kind of “spiritual delicatessen”: 
a buffet of disparate notions, from which Westerners can pick, choose 
and digest individual elements for their own purposes. In this regard, a 
major focus of my research is to document the variety of Western appro-
priations from Dharma that become reformulated (without attribution) 
into Judaism, Christianity, and Western science. Enterprising new “pioneers 
of Western thought” can claim this digested Indian knowledge as the 
product of their original discoveries; subsequently, the Indian sources are 
erased and replaced with Western substitutes. I have written a series of 
case studies documenting such a process of digestion, in disciplines 
ranging across philosophy of science, religion, linguistics, arts, medicine, 
botany, neurosciences, healing paradigms and more. While many such 
digestions have merit because they can enhance old ideas, many others 
cause distortions and limit the potential for Dharma to play its part on the 
world stage. In an effort to boost their own status, scholars who serve as 
the facilitators of digestion typically map dharmic contributions onto the 
limited frameworks of Judeo-Christianity. 
One of my reasons for writing Being Different was to sharpen our 
understanding of the differences between civilizational frameworks which 
the digestive transfers of knowledge typically fail to protect. I have 
pointed out the sleight-of-hand nature of many digestions, such as the 
frenzied efforts to develop and repackage ideas of Dharma into “Wilber’s 
Integral Theory,” “Non-dual/Integral Christianity,” “Integral Judaism,” 
feminine divinities in Western religions, sacredness of the earth, Christian 
Yoga, and the like. Larson’s arguments that Dharma is “incoherent” 
serve to divert attention away from this massive intellectual plunder by 
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the West. My project has been to constantly remind the “pioneers” behind 
these acts of digestion of their appropriations, misappropriations, and 
occasionally blatant plagiarism. The articulation of difference serves as a 
starting point in many such conversations.  
At this juncture I wish to contrast Western appropriations from Greece 
with those from India. The modern conception of Western civilization 
includes Greece as a subset, making it unnecessary for Western scholars 
to replace Hellenistic sources with other Western substitutes. Hellenistic 
sources have retained their identity and distinctiveness. When modern 
Western scholars treat those thinkers as source material, they receive 
proper attribution.  
In contrast, India remains in Western eyes the non-Western other; India 
is too different, too far away, and too massive to be included intact within 
the West. The inclusion of a unified India in the Western self-conception 
would threaten the very sense of what it means to be “Western.” Therefore, 
what India offers must be broken into smaller parts that can be separately 
consumed and digested. For this to become possible, the coherence of 
India must be undermined, by emphasizing its fragmentation and inco-
herence.  
This intellectual breakup of India is akin to a predator’s breaking up of 
its prey into morsels that lend themselves to digestion. It would not be 
feasible to swallow a large prey whole within the predator’s body. Instead, 
it must be cut into parts, and as it passes through the predator’s digestive 
system it must be further broken systematically, until every last protein 
and nucleic acid molecule has been processed by enzymes to yield raw-
material as nutrients for the predator’s growth. Ultimately, no trace remains 
of the prey’s own DNA; meanwhile, the raw-material nutrients produced 
by digestion are reassembled into the predator’s cells, under the control 
of the predator’s DNA.  
The appropriation and absorption of non-Western sources into the West 
proceeds by a similar kind of digestive process, so that the West may 
retain its sense of selfhood while capturing whatever aspects of India it 
seeks to own. This is why the mainstream Western academy does not 
teach Abhinavagupta, Bharata, Bhart®hari, Çakara, Kålidåsa, Kåpila, 
Kau†ilya, Någårjuna, På~ini, Patañjali, Råmånuja, and other Indian greats 
on par with the great Greek thinkers. This double standard contradicts the 
idea of a truly “flat world,” wherein classical thinkers of all civilizations 
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would be incorporated into curricula based on their merit and current 
relevance.  
Just as the individual ego is the nexus of one’s narrative about oneself, 
so also a peoples’ collective ego centers upon its shared coherent narra-
tive. The West’s expansive collective self ascribes a teleological role to 
its own coherence. Because it finds itself coherent and views the other as 
incoherent, it seeks to digest the source of that perceived incoherence by 
breaking it into fragments and selectively mapping some of those frag-
ments onto its own framework. Whatever it discards ends up being ejected 
as the waste product of the digestion process. This is why the act of 
bolstering one’s own coherence, while undermining the coherence of 
others, is so central to the game of civilizational aggression.  
Despite the fond hopes of postmodernism, the competition between 
collective identities is not fading away; rather, it is actively intensifying, 
as the global demand for material things outstrips their supply. In Being 
Different, I point out that postmodern thought has influenced the Indian 
elites to view their own heritage as incoherent and further to imagine that 
all other nations are also blurring their identities to the same extent. They 
do not realize that the postmodern deconstruction of grand narratives has 
been vastly asymmetrical with respect to its effects on the West and the 
non-West. This is why Being Different stands clear of the infinitely regres-
sive trap of postmodern nihilism; it does not permit outlying exceptions 
to negate the overwhelming salience of characteristic features in either 
Dharma or Western civilization. Studies that avoid the categories of 
Dharma or the West invariably fall into this trap, crippling any further 
efforts to understand the intended objects of their gaze, and ultimately 
reinforcing the status quo of Western domination.  
 
Larson’s Theory of India’s Incoherence 
To illustrate the syndrome wherein many Western scholars want to empha-
size India’s incoherence, I shall refer to Larson’s 1995 book, India’s 
Agony Over Religion, in which he takes a stand on the issue of continuity 
and coherence in Indian civilization. He writes: 
 
Whatever continuity one finds in Indian history and culture is directly 
related to India’s basic discontinuities. Another way of putting the 
same point is to say that there is nothing like an abstract “essence” of 
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Indian civilization. There are, to be sure, distinctive cultural presuppo-
sitions operating in each of the six historical periods (the Indus Valley, 
the Indo-Bråham~ical, the Indo-Çrama~ical, the Indic, the Indo-Islamic 
and the Indo-Anglian) that we have examined. But there are no common 
features or presuppositions that hold overall. What emerges, instead, 
by way of continuity is a certain distinctive kind of on-going conversa-
tion or cluster of conversations about the salience of certain diverse, even 
contradictory, cultural values and who or what are the basic warrants 
or authorities for those cultural values.…The coherence, however, is 
not to be found in the specific contents of a given historical period or 
the authoritative utterances of this or that particular group (Larson 
2005: 142–43). 
 
Earlier in the same book, he lays the foundation for his theory of Indian 
civilization as a series of discontinuous “layers,” and further alleges that 
each such layer has foreign origins:  
 
It should be noted that in an important sense one can plausibly argue 
that all of the layers come from the ‘outside,’ as it were, that is to say, 
the layers are not indigenous to the subcontinent. This is obviously true 
for layers (2) through (4) (53).  
 
On the same page, he defines layers 2, 3, and 4 as Indo-Bråhma~ical        
(c. 1500–600 BCE), Indo-Çrama~ical (c. 600 BCE–300 CE), and Indic 
(Hindu-Buddhist-Jain) (c. 300–1200), respectively. 
Larson is very clear that Sanskrit and Dharma derive from foreign 
“Åryan” origins, as illustrated in his following passage: 
 
What is reasonably clear is that some time in the early part of the second 
millennium (just after c. 2000 BCE), semi-nomadic warrior tribes who 
had been living in the steppeland that ranges from Eastern Europe to 
Central Asia began to undergo extensive migrations.…The tribes con-
quered local people as they moved, inter-married with the indigenous 
population and developed into a ruling elite. They were known as 
Årya-s or Åryan-s (meaning ‘noble ones’), and those Åryan tribes that 
reached Persia and India are known as Indo-Iranians or Indo-Åryans.… 
These Indo-Åryan nomadic tribes brought with them into India in the 
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middle of the second millennium (c. 1500 BCE) a number of cultural 
characteristics that were to prove determinative for the development of 
later India civilization… (58). 
 
He goes on to state that these foreign “Åryans” brought with them several 
elements of dharmic culture: the Sanskrit language, the patrilineal system 
of social hierarchy that became the caste system, the practice of conducting 
elaborate sacrificial rituals involving hallucinogenic substances called 
soma, and an entire pantheon of imported gods. He does not attempt to 
defend this view of history; he simply assumes its complete validity, 
including the dates he ascribes to these supposed “layers” of Indian civili-
zation and his contention that each “layer” originated outside India; and 
he makes no effort even to support his assertion that these “layers” are 
discontinuous and in conflict with one another. In fact, his assumptions 
about Indian history, which premise his entire thesis of an internal conflict 
within Dharma, amount to no more than a reformulation of old colonial 
Indology: itself a shaky edifice that is now much questioned. 
I appreciated certain aspects of Larson’s book when I read it in the 1990s. 
Still, I could not help noticing that he clearly chose not to examine Christian 
claims from a Hindu perspective. Even when he explains Indian coher-
ence in terms of karma, he stops short of using the perspective afforded 
by a karma-based worldview to reverse the gaze at Christianity. Had he 
proceeded in that direction, he might have better appreciated chapter 2 of 
Being Different, which uses the postulates of dharma (including karma 
and reincarnation) to examine the notions of Original Sin, Virgin Birth, 
Crucifixion, Redemption, and the End Times. Considering how central 
these notions have been to the Nicene Creed, and hence to Christianity,  
it is most unfortunate that he eschews such comparisons. His evident 
discomfort with Being Different may well reflect his realization of where 
such a path of gaze reversal might lead. 
It is not surprising, then, that Larson promotes imported solutions to 
bring coherence to India. In his essay in this issue, he lists some Indian 
thinkers who, evidently, serve as his role models for scholarship on 
Indian civilization. “Only the ‘solution of synthesis’,” he writes, “was 
able to prevail” in their works. He highlights what he characterizes as the 
irreconcilable but fascinating “differences” among various Indic tradi-
tions and proposes that unifying solutions must be derived primarily 
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from India’s interactions with the West. He goes on to advocate the 
approaches of Amartya Sen and V.S. Naipaul, even though it is well 
known that they lack adequate grounding in classical Indian traditions 
and are largely influenced by Western universalism. Their critique of the 
West tends to be largely the West’s own self-critique replicated through 
brown-skinned luminaries. In the matter of bringing coherence to India, 
Larson’s solution is clearly imported. 
Larson says that I have allowed myself “to get caught up in what might 
be called the self-referential problem (sometimes also called the ‘self-
referential paradox’).” He implies that I can be accused of the very thing 
I charge others with: namely, that I am “digesting” the dharmic traditions 
into one monolithic and forced whole. By the same token, he himself 
falls victim to this very paradox by insisting upon seeing the four Dharma 
traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism as disparate 
enough to defy categorization under a single umbrella or family; which is 
clearly a stance characteristic of his training as a Christian minister to 
look upon these entities through the lens of “religion.” Given the nature 
of Abrahamic religions, it is unconsciously assumed by many scholars 
that a faith must be principally defined by the most history-centric (and 
hence, the most exclusivist) of its precepts. This unfortunate assumption 
blinds Larson to the existence of a shared sask®ti of culture and catego-
ries underlying all four of the Dharma traditions. A great many of the 
errors made by the authors of the essays in this issue, and by my critics 
elsewhere, have been the result of examining Dharma in terms of the two 
essentially separate Western categories of “religion” and “ethics,” and 
thereby declaring Dharma deficient on both counts.5 
 
Some Further Points  
 
History Centrism: The Elephant in the Room 
Unfortunately, Yelle, Larson and Gier do not directly comment on my 
history centrism theory and my claim that this is a major characteristic 
differentiating the Abrahamic and dharmic traditions. Yelle tries to 
discredit a few of the examples I have used, even though none of these 
examples is central to the theory itself. For instance: 
(i) Being Different mentions how history centrism shaped the clash 
between Christian Zionism and Islam over the Dome of the Rock. Yelle 
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writes that upon reading this, his “jaw literally dropped. It is not possible 
that Malhotra is unaware of the destruction of Babri Masjid by Hindutva 
radicals at Ayodhya in 1992.” In response to him, I do regard the pos-
ture of certain Hindus towards Ayodhya as an attempt to turn Dharma 
into a history centrism version—the “Westernization” of Hinduism; and 
this serves to illustrate that my notion of history centrism has broad 
application. That being said, the degree to which history centrism has 
prevailed upon Hinduism is far less than in the case of Abrahamic reli-
gions. Dharma’s central qualities have not been shaped by it, unlike the 
Abrahamic religions, where God’s separation from humans makes the 
prophetic lineages the only means through which those religions have 
received their core texts. Canons are essentially history textbooks. Yelle 
misses a good opportunity to use history centrism and argue against those 
strains of Hinduism which seek to remake it in the image of Western 
religions. 
(ii) Another illustration of history centrism in Being Different is that 
the history centric events that took place in the Garden of Eden have 
often meant that the body is seen as sinful, a view accepted by many 
respectable theologians and major churches. Yelle’s rejoinder is that I 
neglect “the parallel with ancient traditions of asceticism and celibacy in 
India.” But this misses the point: Indian celibacy/asceticism is not based 
on a singular history centric event equivalent to the Fall in Eden. Indeed, 
there are many similar features in both cultures, but they do not result 
from the same axioms. I am comparing the underlying axioms. 
(iii) Yelle takes exception to Being Different’s explanation of the impor-
tance given to bloodlines ever since the Old Testament. He writes: “Within 
the Church itself, arguably the notion of ‘race’ did not emerge until the 
blood purity laws (limpieza de sangre) toward the end of the Reconquista 
in Spain; that is to say, they were part of an internal colonialism linked to 
a new, external colonialism.” However, the issue here is not racial purity 
in the modern sense that Yelle uses, but rather the passing along of the 
religious lineage along ethnic lines. I do not think any Old Testament 
scholar would disagree that this is a major preoccupation of the ancient 
Israelites. 
Gier, too, fails to acknowledge the book’s central idea of history cen-
trism, even though it is stated very explicitly as the basis for my contrasts. 
He tries to refute the idea that Christian history gives far greater theolo-
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gical importance to its martyrs than Dharma does, by claiming that martyr-
dom existed in India in a comparable manner. He cites that millions of 
Indians were killed by Muslims and that various other individuals such 
as Gandhi died as martyrs. Of course, in the history of every nation and 
people there are numerous examples of individuals who have been killed 
on religious grounds, but my intention was to highlight the importance 
given by Christian military expansion to honoring martyrs in God’s name 
and to encouraging martyrdom explicitly as a religious act. While many 
people were made Christian saints specifically for their martyrdom, the 
criteria for achieving greatness as a yog or a ®‚i or a guru is not met by 
getting killed in military action. The theological difference here is that 
unlike living jvanmuktas or living nirvå~as, Christians must be dead 
before they can be elevated to sainthood. This difference cannot be glossed 
over by merely citing that there is killing in all religions. 
 
Intellectual Elitism 
Another charge I wish to address, stated directly by Larson but also alluded 
to by others, is that some of the ideas I use to characterize Dharma were 
propounded by elite thinkers (the “neo-Brahmins”) who, according to 
Larson, comprise a mere 3.5 percent of the Indian population. Were we 
to apply this same criterion to test the validity of prominent Western ideas, 
we would also have to confront the fact that only a tiny fraction of one 
percent of all Christians have been theologians who made any kind of 
impact upon Christianity; indeed, that a miniscule percent of Westerners 
have been sufficiently gifted to formulate the ideas which significantly 
influenced the course of Western science or philosophy. One does not 
question the legitimacy of theoretical physics, for instance, based on the 
fact that an extremely tiny percent of the general population has partici-
pated in formulating its precepts. In any society, and regardless of culture 
or discipline, it is only a small fraction of thinkers who nucleate long-
term change and who are equipped to propose the concepts that wider 
segments of the population may eventually absorb and institutionalize 
through a process of selection. Larson needs better arguments than this to 
support his criticisms. 
 
Dharma and Physics 
Gier is troubled that I cite several prominent modern physicists whose 
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ideas were inspired by Hinduism and/or Buddhism. I tend to agree with 
Gier that most such scientists had limited knowledge of Indian philosophy, 
but nothing in Being Different relies upon the correctness or extent of 
their ideas of Indian philosophy. It is their understanding of the philosophy 
of physics that I am discussing. Gier says that he “side[s] with Stapp’s 
idea” on quantum mechanics, and in response I wish to point out that I 
knew Henry Stapp in the 1990s and that before he wrote his seminal 
book, Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics, he had extensively stud-
ied the Vai‚~ava interpretation of quantum mechanics with the help of 
Vai‚~ava scholars in California and Mumbai. His research was published 
as A Report on the Gaudiya Vaishnava Vedanta Form of Vedic Ontology 
(1994), in which he explains that Gau;ya Vai‚~ava Vedånta provides an 
internally consistent and complete interpretation of quantum phenomena 
whereas Western thought at that time did not. He was not alone in this 
assessment among Western scientists till the 1990s, and only years later 
were these ideas gradually digested into Western frameworks and the 
original Indian sources faded into oblivion.  
Gier brings into his analysis various Western theorists who borrowed 
heavily from Indian sources when he writes that “contemporary physics 
does not support the idea that the universe is a cosmic mind, and both 
theory and empirical data point to a radical pluralism of discrete entities 
rather than an undifferentiated divine entity.” First of all, I have already 
clarified in this essay that my position has never been to support an 
“undifferentiated divine entity.” Second, even if we assume that his 
position reflects an adequate knowledge of physics, it makes no difference 
to my thesis—which is about Indian influences, regardless of whether or 
not a given Western borrower was accurate in his borrowing. An inaccu-
rate borrowing is also an influence, and in fact, many influences travel in 
this manner.  
 
Lack of Mutual Respect Outside the Academy 
To illustrate the problems with current interfaith debates, one of the 
examples cited in Being Different is an event that took place at Claremont 
Graduate University. Representatives of various religions who attended 
this event had prepared a resolution to “tolerate” each other, and I sug-
gested that this be replaced by the term “mutual respect.” Gier assigns 
great importance to the Claremont reference, and his refutation of my 
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position is rather strange. It hinges on one theologian, John B. Cobb, at 
Claremont. Gier goes on to describe the curriculum at Claremont and 
various other details, none of which have any relevance to the point at 
hand. My criticism does not apply to Claremont as an institution, or to 
Cobb, or any other member of its faculty. The fact that Claremont held 
such an event does not mean that all the speakers would reflect the 
positions held by one or more Claremont scholars—after all, it was an 
interfaith event with speakers unaffiliated with the university. Gier’s view 
is one seen from an Ivory Tower; that is to say, he seems to think that a 
few scholars on campus are representative of society at large. 
 
Chaos 
Regarding Being Different’s examination of the position given in Hinduism 
to what Westerners call “chaos,” Yelle finds it compelling that Victor 
Turner’s 1977 work on “structure versus anti-structure, liminality, and 
communitas” shows the same to be true of the West. The Carnival in 
Roman Catholicism is cited as an example of similar stances with regard 
to chaos. But this example is not biblical and is most likely the result of 
absorption (“digestion”) of pre-Christian paganism from Greece, Rome, 
and elsewhere. In any case, Being Different’s extensive treatment of the 
nature of “chaos” in Hindu narratives, cosmology, and philosophy cannot 
be trivialized by a comparison to modern Catholic pop culture. Being 
Different cites American research on the U.S. government’s suspicion of 
India during the Cold War, because it saw India’s polytheism, paganism, 
millions of gods and chaos in general as indicators that it was an 
unreliable ally. By contrast, the U.S. government sources cited in the 
declassified U.S. documents regarded monotheistic Pakistan as more 
certain about its idea of truth and thus more stable. Yelle misses the 
implication of this point when he writes: “[Malhotra] blames communalist 
ideologies and the associated violence in the subcontinent on the ill 
effects of an exclusivist ideology imported from monotheistic traditions 




Gross is right in pointing out the obvious omission of Islam from Being 
Different. In an earlier draft I sought to include Islam in my analysis, but 
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found that I could not do the complexities justice. While Islam is an 
Abrahamic religion and subject to much of what I say about them, it is 
also very different from Judaism and Christianity and hence it warrants a 
separate treatment.  
 
Caste 
I also readily admit to the absence of any elaborate treatment of caste. 
Being Different mentions that traditionally var~a-dharma was diverse, 
contextual, flexible and flowing. Ironically, Yelle opposes my non-essen-
tialist approach to caste and would like to see it essentialized. All of a 
sudden his talk of heterogeneity of views and cultures seems to disappear. 
He is troubled by my statement that “different communities within the 
same society were allowed to practice their own codes,” even though this 
resists homogeneity. Furthermore, Yelle fails to substantiate his position 
that caste was a matter of “external imposition” and does not give a shred 
of evidence that any “external” institution “imposed” it. To the best of 
my knowledge, there was never a central church-like institution to impose 
it.  
Overall, Yelle and Larson are correct in observing that Being Different 
does not emphasize caste discrimination, communal violence, and so 
forth as a central theme. These issues have been discussed across a wide 
range of forums, and I myself have addressed them elsewhere. The 
purpose of Being Different, however, is to de-center Western universalism. 
Cluttering this particular text with scripted tropes of little or no relevance 
would only have diverted attention from its primary purpose of reversing 
the gaze upon the West. The issue of caste would lead to a debate about 
the social stratification and oppression in each civilization, and the extent 
to which each system of bias is philosophically rooted as opposed to 
being the result of historical events. Caste is a separate topic in itself. It 
does not lead to comparisons of the philosophical axioms that Being 
Different wants to uncover, because caste is not a philosophical axiom in 




I wish to clarify here that I am not opposed to cross-fertilization among 
cultures. On the contrary, I favor such transactions while remaining 
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mindful of the ethics involved and exploring their implications for the 
sustainability of civilizational diversity. Furthermore, I do not wish to 
deny the important contributions made by Western thinkers to philoso-
phies that resemble Indian thought. What Being Different takes exception 
to is the fact that Indian sources get sidelined and replaced by Western 
ones with retroactive effect; that is, through the dubious backward projec-
tion of knowledge borrowed from Indian sources onto supposed Western 
equivalents of antiquity. Being Different’s sections titled “Digestion and 
Assimilation” (36–38) and “The Templeton Project to Re-invent the 
West” (141–44) discuss this syndrome in explicit detail, demonstrating 
how it leads to distorted accounts of both civilizations.  
The West should harvest the fruits of Indian knowledge, by all means; 
however, it must also nurture and respect the roots of the tree that bore 
them. This would entail developing a stance conducive to genuine and 
sustainable coexistence with other civilizations; one that is premised 
upon a relationship between equals who offer one another mutual respect 
for whatever differences exist between them. Contrary to the wishful 
thinking of many sheltered liberal arts academicians, such a desirable 




1. Brahmachari spent six years in the USA, from 1933 to 1939. In 
1933, he was appointed international Secretary of the World Fellowship 
and set out on a lecture tour of 63 American cities. He delivered 345 
addresses and was a guest in 29 universities and colleges. Thomas Merton 
was one of many prominent theologians who paid tribute to Brahmachari. 
2. For an incisive critique of the Christian theologians’ claims to “ration-
ality” see Dharmasiri (1988). 
3. Gier might be more correct in characterizing Hartshorne as a “ration-
alist” if that term referred specifically to Hartshorne’s reliance upon the 
Hegelian-Kantian a priori procedure of deductive reasoning. 
4. The fact, however, is that Hartshorne did borrow extensively from 
JBva GosvåmB, but did not want to admit this.  
5. See pages 259–63 in Being Different for a concise explanation of the 
difference between Dharma and religion, and pages 191–203 for an expla-
nation of the contextual nature of Dharma. 
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